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In 2015, the Third Circuit took a rare opportunity to con-
sider the meaning of SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(7), which allows share-
holder proposals which address ordinary business matters to 
be excluded from a proxy statement unless they target matters 
of sufficiently significant social policy. In doing so, a split 
panel broke from decades of SEC practice and provoked a re-
sponse from the Division of Corporate Finance, which is 
charged with the Rule’s application. The Division attempted—
and failed—to clarify what it understands the social policy ex-
ception to require. This Note analyzes the Division’s practice 
since its confused response to determine whether its interpreta-
tion of the significant social policy exception has changed.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A renewed focus on corporations’ roles in solving—and cre-
ating—our social problems has made strange bedfellows of 
corporate investors and social activists. Securities Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) Rule 14a-8 governing shareholder pro-
posals gives activists the power to seek social change through 
changes in companies’ behavior, whether it be to challenge 
discriminatory hiring practices, reconsider the sale of highly 
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dangerous products, or dramatically alter environmental 
practices. But, weary of paralysis from too much intervention, 
Rule 14a-8 gives companies reciprocal power to decide on 
which proposals its shareholders will ultimately vote. Gener-
ally, when a proposal targets what the company considers to 
be a matter of ordinary business—as each of the above-men-
tioned changes can—the company may prevent the proposal 
from going to a vote. However, mindful of the value of investor 
confidence and socially beneficial corporate behavior, the SEC 
created an exception to this rule for proposals which touch on 
issues of sufficiently significant social policy. Though only re-
cently litigated, this has been an admittedly vague rule for 
decades. Now, for the first time, a federal circuit court has 
taken up the question of what must be shown to satisfy this 
exception. In response to that decision, the SEC division 
charged with Rule 14a-8’s application purported to agree with 
the concurring judge, but obscured its interpretation of the ex-
ception in doing so.  
Given the increasing importance of proxy proposals and 
this exception to social-activist shareholders, this Note seeks 
to wash away that obscurity by analyzing not what the SEC 
says, but what it does. Part II describes the proxy process as 
a mechanism for voting on shareholder proposals and the rel-
evant rules and procedures. Part III identifies exactly where 
the problem in the current interpretation(s) comes from by an-
alyzing the Third Circuit’s decision in Trinity Wall Street v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.1 and the Division of Corporate Finance’s 
(the “Division”) response in Bulletin 14H. Part IV argues for 
three propositions with which to test the Division’s behavior—
in order to reveal its true position on the social policy excep-
tion—and applies those tests to the available data. Part V ul-
timately concludes that the Division’s position likely remains 
unchanged, despite patent ambiguity in Bulletin 14H.  
 
1 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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II. BACKGROUND ON THE SHAREHOLDER 
PROPOSAL RULES AND SOCIAL POLICY 
EXCEPTION 
Shareholders, whether individuals or legal entities con-
trolled by people, have both private interests as well as per-
sonal opinions about what is best for society. A shareholder 
can use their ownership interest in a company to satisfy their 
private interests (in maximizing a return on their investment, 
for example), but they may also use their access to bring about 
social change they deem desirable. Occasionally, this will re-
quire a shareholder to submit a proposed course of action to 
other shareholders for a vote through the process governed by 
SEC Rule 14a-8.2  
A. Process for Submitting a Shareholder Proposal 
Rule 14a-8 requires a company to include any shareholder 
proposal on its proxy card that complies with the rule’s proce-
dural requirements and for which there is no substantive ba-
sis of exclusion under 14a-8(i).  
A shareholder proposal is a “recommendation or require-
ment that the company and/or its board of directors take ac-
tion, which [the proponent] intends to present at a meeting of 
the company’s shareholders.”3 Shareholders may vote either 
in person or by proxy.4 
 
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2017). 
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (2017). The Section outlines the shareholder 
proposal process in a series of questions and answers. See also MORRISON & 
FOERSTER, LLP, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT SHAREHOLDER PRO-
POSALS AND PROXY ACCESS 1, https://media2.mofo.com/documents/fre-
quently-asked-questions-about-shareholder-proposals-and-proxy-ac-
cess.pdf [perma.cc/xw4n-wsup]. 
4 “A proxy is a written authorization that one person gives to another 
person to act on the first person’s behalf. In the context of corporate elec-
tions, when a shareholder votes ‘by proxy,’ he or she is instructing someone 
(often members of the company’s management) to vote his or her shares in 
accordance with his or her instructions, as reflected on the proxy card, at 
the meeting.” Spotlight on Proxy Matters: The Mechanics of Voting, SEC 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxymatters/voting_mechanics.shtml 
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In order to be eligible to submit a proposal, the shareholder 
“must have continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, 
or 1%, of the company’s securities entitled to be voted on at 
the meeting for at least one year by the date [of submission].”5 
Each shareholder may submit only one proposal per share-
holders’ meeting.6 Further, each proposal and accompanying 
supporting statement may not exceed 500 words.7 Finally, 
“the proposal must be received at the company’s principal ex-
ecutive offices not less than 120 calendar days” before the date 
associated with the prior year’s proxy statement made in con-
nection with the annual meeting.  
If the company hopes to omit the proposal from its materi-
als, “it must file its reasons with the Commission no later than 
[eighty] calendar days before it files its definitive proxy state-
ment and form of proxy,” as well as “[a]n explanation of why 
the company believes that it may exclude the proposal.”8 Un-
less noted otherwise, “the burden is on the company to demon-
strate that it is entitled to exclude a proposal.”9 This filing al-
most always takes the form of a request for a no-action letter, 
which is a generally-available service to entities subject to fed-
eral securities law.10 Based on the reasons a company pro-
vides, the no-action letter will “describe the request, analyze 
the particular facts and circumstances involved, discuss appli-
cable laws and rules, and [if granted, conclude the staff will 
not recommend enforcement action].”11 
 
[perma.cc/ss5s-9qsr]. The proxy card will list the items to be voted on at the 
meeting, including shareholder proposals made under Rule 14a-8. For an 
example of a standard proxy card, see Sample Proxy Card, SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxymatters/proxy_sample.htm 
[perma.cc/K75D-QM4K]. 
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1) (2017). 
6 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (2017). 
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (2017). 
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j) (2017). 
9 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(g) (2017). 
10 See No-Action Letters, SEC (Mar. 23, 2017) https://www.sec.gov/fast-
answers/answersnoactionhtm.html [perma.cc/GQ5R-UKXU]. 
11 Id. 
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A company may also exclude a shareholder’s proposal from 
its proxy statement based on the substance of the proposal.12 
These thirteen content-focused rules exclude proposals that 
relate to issues such as director elections or personal griev-
ances, conflict with state law, or would be impossible to imple-
ment.13 One of those provisions is called the “ordinary busi-
ness exclusion.”14  
B. Rule 14a-8(i)(7): The Ordinary Business Exclusion 
and the Implied Social Policy Exception 
A company may exclude a shareholder proposal from its 
proxy materials “[i]f the proposal deals with a matter relating 
to the company’s ordinary business operations.”15 The ordi-
nary business exclusion originated in the Commission’s 1954 
Adopting Release with language substantially similar to the 
current text.16 The Commission hoped to use the new exclu-
sion “to relieve the management of the necessity of including 
in its proxy material security holder proposals which relate to 
matters falling within the province of the management.”17 
The term “ordinary business operations” is not defined, 
and the rule does not articulate a standard for when a pro-
posal sufficiently “relates to” those operations. The lack of def-
inition makes the scope of the rule vague. Consequently, as 
the Commission has itself acknowledged, the rule has gener-
ated significant controversy.18 
 
12 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (2017). 
13 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (2017). 
14 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2017). 
15 Id. 
16 See SEC, Solicitations of Proxies, Exchange Act Release No. 34-3347, 
19 Fed. Reg. 246, 246 (1954) (originally codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
8(c)(5)) (“If the proposal consists of a recommendation or request that the 
management take action with respect to a matter relating to the conduct of 
the ordinary business operations of the issuer.”). 
17 SEC, Solicitation of Proxies: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 18 Fed. 
Reg. 6646, 6647 (1953). 
18 SEC, Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security 
Holders, 41 Fed. Reg. 52994, 52998 (Dec. 3, 1976) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
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The SEC has used its discretion to interpret the rule to 
vary the scope over time. These interpretations were formal-
ized and made binding in a series of adopting releases. 
Twenty-two years after the rule’s inception, one of these “in-
terpretations” created the significant social policy exception. 
In its 1976 Adopting Release, the SEC first announced that 
certain proposals pertaining to “substantial policy or other 
considerations” must be included in a company’s proxy state-
ment, even if they might relate to what was previously a mat-
ter of ordinary business.19 In implementing that release, the 
Staff took a formalist approach to reviewing no-action re-
quests. Specifically, “the staff [had] taken the position that 
proposals requesting issuers to prepare reports on specific as-
pects of their business or to form special committees to study 
a segment of their business would not be excludable” under 
the exemption.20 There were no subject-matter limitations, so 
long as the proposal in form requested a report or committee 
study on those subjects. 
But in 1983, the SEC abruptly changed course. Its new ap-
proach considered instead whether the “subject matter” of 
such a committee study or report “involves a matter of ordi-
nary business.”21 Where the previous approach was overly for-
mal and easy to circumvent, the new approach would look at 
the true purpose of a proposal regardless of its framing.  
 
240) (recognizing a substantially similar provision had, “in the past year or 
so, generated a significant amount of controversy”). 
19 SEC, Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security 
Holders, 41 Fed. Reg. 52994, 52998 (1976) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
20 SEC, Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, 48 Fed. Reg. 38218, 
38220–21 (Aug. 23, 1983) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). See also SEC, Pro-
posed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, 47 C.F.R. 47422–22 (Oct. 26, 
1982) (laying out concerns that the staff were elevating form over substance 
in declining to issue no-action letters for the types of proposals mentioned). 
21 SEC, Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, 48 Fed. Reg. 38218, 
38220–21 (Aug. 23, 1983) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
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In 1992, the SEC continued its trend of expanding the or-
dinary business exclusion22 when the staff issued the contro-
versial Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter,23 later affirmed by 
the Commission.24 Cracker Barrel shareholders proposed im-
plementing new hiring policies relating to sexual orientation. 
The letter stated that “the fact that a shareholder proposal 
concerning a company’s employment policies and practices for 
the general workforce is tied to a social issue will no longer be 
viewed as removing the proposal from the realm of ordinary 
business . . . . Rather, determinations with respect to any such 
proposals are properly governed by the employment-based na-
ture of the proposal.”25 The Division relied entirely on the na-
ture of the business practice being targeted to determine 
whether the proposal was excludable. This decision effectively 
eliminated the social policy exception for employment-related 
proposals, regardless of the content of such proposal or the so-
cial issue it implicated.  
The Commission quickly reversed its decision in Cracker 
Barrel, seeking “a return to a case-by-case analytical ap-
proach” that would avoid categorical exemptions.26 This was 
the position first articulated in the 1976 Adopting Release,27 
where the Commission outlined the policy considerations rel-
evant to the social policy exception. Certain tasks are funda-
mental to managers’ ability to run the day-to-day of a com-
pany and could not practicably be subject to shareholder 
control. However, sufficiently significant social policy issues 
“transcend” the day-to-day such that they would be 
 
22 At the time, codified as 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7). 
23 Cracker Barrel Old County Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 
WL 289095 (Oct. 13, 1992). 
24 See SEC, Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 29106, 29108 n.35 (May 28, 1998) (citing Letter from Jonathan G. Katz, 
Sec’y to the Comm’n, to Sue Ellen Dodell, Deputy Counsel, Office of Comp-
troller, City of N.Y. (Jan. 15, 1993)). 
25 See Cracker Barrel, supra note 23, at *2. 
26 SEC, Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63 Fed. Reg. 
29106, 29108 (May 28, 1998). 
27 Id. 
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appropriate for a shareholder vote.28 For example, employ-
ment decisions such as hiring and firing are clearly essential 
managerial responsibilities that shareholders could not prac-
tically assume for themselves. But, hiring and firing do impli-
cate significant issues of discrimination, so proposals focused 
on those issues would be appropriate. A proposal to hire Jane 
Doe would be excludable, but a proposal to create a report on 
workplace diversity would not.29 
This was the state of the law prior to the Third Circuit’s 
2015 decision in Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.30 
Before Trinity, when the SEC received a no-action request, it 
would look to the content of the proposal, on a case by case 
basis, to determine whether the proposal related to an ordi-
nary business matter, and if so, whether it related to an issue 
of sufficiently significant social policy to justify its inclusion. 
The SEC still failed to define what constituted an ordinary 
business matter, when a proposal sufficiently related to it, or 
when a social policy issue was sufficiently significant.  
The split court’s decision in Trinity put forth two ap-
proaches, both of which differed from the Division’s approach 
in its Trinity No-Action Letter. The Trinity majority created 
an additional requirement for satisfying the social policy ex-
ception, going beyond the standard that the Division had pre-
viously applied. The concurring judge rejected the new re-
quirement and applied the old social policy exception but came 
to a different conclusion than the Division. Part II analyzes 
the majority and concurring opinions in Trinity and the Divi-





29 See, e.g., Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877, 890 (1993) (declining to follow Cracker 
Barrel and declaring a proposal requiring Wal-Mart to issue a report on em-
ployee relations was not excludable under the ordinary business exclusion). 
30 Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 
2015) (reversing the District Court’s decision in 75 F. Supp. 3d 617, 2014 
WL 6790928 (D. Del. 2014)). 
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III. DIVERGENT COURT AND SEC 
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ORDINARY BUSINESS 
EXCLUSION FOLLOWING TRINITY  
A. Trinity: Two New Interpretations for Rule 14a-
8(i)(7) Applications  
1. Facts and Procedural Background 
On July 6, 2015, the Third Circuit squarely addressed the 
issue of the proper test to determine whether a proposal can 
be excluded under the ordinary business exemption.31 Trinity 
Wall Street is a major institutional investor and one of the 
wealthiest religious institutions in the United States.32 As a 
religious organization concerned with gun violence and as an 
investor in Wal-Mart, Trinity objected to the company’s sale 
of automatic weapons equipped with high-capacity maga-
zines.33 The broadly-worded proposal submitted to the Board 
requested that Wal-Mart: 
Provide oversight concerning [and the public report-
ing of] the formulation and implementation of . . . pol-
icies and standards that determine whether or not the 
Company should sell a product that: 1) especially en-
dangers public safety and well-being; 2) has the sub-
stantial potential to impair the reputation of the Com-
pany; and/or 3) would reasonably be considered by 
many as offensive to the family and community values 
integral to the Company’s promotion of its brand.34 
The text of the proposal made no mention of firearms with 
high capacity magazines or social issues related to gun vio-
lence, though the accompanying statements in support of the 
 
31 Trinity, 792 F.3d at 340 (“The principal issue we address is whether 
Trinity’s proposal was excludable because it related to Wal-Mart’s ordinary 
business operations.”). 
32 Id. at 328 (citing Letter from Wall Street CFO Accompanying Trin-
ity’s 2013 Financial Statements (undated)). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 329–30. 
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proposal made it clear that those issues were of primary con-
cern to Trinity.35 
Wal-Mart successfully sought a no-action letter from the 
SEC, which granted the letter because “there appear[ed] to be 
some basis for [Wal-Mart’s] view that [it] may exclude the pro-
posal under rule 14a-8(i)(7), as relating to [its] ordinary busi-
ness operations,” and “[p]roposals concerning the sale of par-
ticular products and services are generally excludable under 
[the rule].”36 Because no-action letters are not binding,37 Trin-
ity took the unusual step of filing suit in federal court to seek 
declaratory judgment and an injunction requiring Wal-Mart 
to include the proposal in its proxy materials.  
The District Court ruled in favor of Trinity, finding that 
Wal-Mart could not use the ordinary business exclusion to 
omit the proposal from its proxy materials.38 The lower court 
relied heavily on the idea that “the proposal wasn’t a directive 
to management but to the Board to ‘oversee the development 
and effectuation of a Wal-Mart policy.’”39 The lower court al-
ternatively held that the proposal focused on sufficiently sig-
nificant social issues, which included the communal effects of 
selling high capacity firearms at the world’s largest retailer, 
 
35 Id. at 330. 
36 Id. at 331 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
2014 WL 409085, at *1 (Mar. 20, 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(modifications in original). 
37 See supra note 10. 
38 Trinity, 792 F.3d at 332–33 (citing 75 F. Supp. 3d 617, 630 (D. Del. 
2014)). 
39 Id. at 333 (quoting 75 F. Supp. 3d 617, 630 (D. Del. 2014)). As the 
latter part of the Third Circuit’s opinion points out, this reasoning echoed 
the overly formalistic approach that the SEC explicitly rejected in its 1983 
amendments. See SEC, Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, 48 Fed. 
Reg. 38218, 38220–21 (Aug. 23, 1983) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); see also 
SEC, Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, 1982 WL 600869, at 
*17 (Oct. 14, 1982) (laying out concerns that the staff were elevating form 
over substance in declining to issue no-action letters on the basis that pro-
posals were directed at the board or called for a special report). 
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to warrant an exception.40 Wal-Mart appealed both of the dis-
trict court’s holdings.  
2. The Majority’s New Rule  
The two-judge majority of the Third Circuit’s panel and a 
concurring judge agreed that Trinity’s proposal related to 
Wal-Mart’s ordinary business operations.41 The court applied 
a two-part test to determine whether Rule 14a-8(i)(7) applies. 
“Under the first step, we discern the ‘subject matter’ of the 
proposal . . . . Under the second, we ask whether that subject 
matter relates to Wal-Mart’s ordinary business operations.”42 
The District Court erred, the panel found, on the first part of 
the test because it placed “undue weight on the distinction be-
tween a directive to management and a request for Board ac-
tion.”43 In focusing too much on form, the lower court failed to 
recognize that “[t]he subject matter of the proposal is instead 
its ultimate consequence—here a potential change in the way 
Wal-Mart decides which products to sell . . . . This view . . . 
finds support in a well-established line of SEC no-action let-
ters.”44 As the panel recognized, the contrary result would per-
mit easy evasion of the ordinary business exclusion by fram-
ing any proposal as a board directive.45 
That was not the end of the inquiry. Wal-Mart then bore 
the burden of showing the social policy exception did not 
 
40 Trinity, 792 F.3d at 333 (quoting Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 75 
F. Supp. 3d 617, 2014 WL 6790928, at *9 (D. Del. 2014)). 
41 Id. at 341, 351 (disagreeing with the District Court’s first holding 
that proposals to the Board are sufficiently removed from the realm of ordi-
nary business). 
42 Id. at 341. 
43 Id. at 342. 
44 Id. at 342–43 (citing Sempra Energy, SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 
WL 6425347, at *2 (Jan. 12, 2012)). 
45 Id. at 344; see also SEC, Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Hold-
ers, 1982 WL 600869, at *17 (Oct. 14, 1982) (laying out concerns that the 
staff were elevating form over substance in declining to issue no-action let-
ters for the types of proposals mentioned). 
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apply. The majority announced a new, two-step test to deter-
mine whether that was the case: “The first [step] is whether 
the proposal focuses on a significant policy (be it social, or as 
noted below, corporate),” then “[i]f it does, we reach the second 
step and ask whether the significant policy issue transcends 
the company’s ordinary business operations.”46  
The majority found that the first step was satisfied because 
“it is hard to counter that Trinity’s proposal doesn’t touch the 
bases of what are significant concerns in our society and cor-
porations in that society.”47 They made reference to Trinity’s 
supporting statement of concern regarding high-capacity au-
tomatic weapons, as well as amici curiae who argued that the 
social policy implications of selling products that endanger 
public safety, a company’s reputation,48 and its core values, 
would be easily on par with employment discrimination, a 
well-recognized exception to Rule 14a-8(i)(7).49  
The majority then proceeded to the novel50 second step. 
Picking up on language that the Commission used in its 1998 
Adopting Release, 51 the majority asked whether the issues of 
 
46 Trinity, 792 F.3d at 345. 
47 Id. at 346. The majority acknowledged that the SEC itself has 
adopted a “we-know-it-when-we-see-it” approach for when significant social 
policy issues are implicated and in effect did the same. 
48 Though not the subject of this Note, one issue is the degree to which 
a company’s reputation and its core values are recognized as valid excep-
tions to Rule 14a-8(i)(7), separate from the issues of broader social concern, 
like public safety. The majority brushed past this question and recognized 
that the proposal, on the whole, raised sufficiently significant social policy 
issues. 
49 Trinity, 792 F.3d at 345–46. 
50 See infra Section II.B. 
51 See SEC, Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 29106, 29108 (May 28, 1998). In a section discussing the policy under-
lying the ordinary business exclusion, the SEC discussed an example pro-
posal that involved management of the workforce (e.g., hiring and promo-
tion). Id. The SEC said those managerial tasks themselves “are so 
fundamental to management’s ability to run a company on a day-to-day ba-
sis that they could not, as a practical matter, be subject to direct shareholder 
oversight.” Id.  
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significant social policy that they identified “transcend” Wal-
Mart’s ordinary business operations, arguing “the transcend-
ence requirement plays a pivotal role in the social-policy ex-
ception calculus.”52 The majority found that the social policy 
implications of Trinity’s proposal did not transcend Wal-
Mart’s “core business” function of selling varied goods.53  
The majority based its analysis on the concern that a for-
malistic approach to this issue would permit intolerable cir-
cumvention of the rule.54 Though the Commission previously 
avoided formalistic analysis when identifying a proposal’s 
subject matter—instead looking to the “true intent” behind a 
proposal55—it had not inquired into whether a proposal whose 
subject matter concededly touches on significant social issues 
“truly intends” to address them.  
For the majority, the relevant inquiry is whether the pro-
posal’s subject matter “is disengaged from the essence of [the 
company’s] business” or “too entwined with the fundamentals 
of the daily activities of [the company].”56 The court used this 
inquiry to distinguish between proposals which relate to 
 
However, proposals relating to such matters but focusing on 
sufficiently significant social policy issues (e.g. significant 
discrimination matters) generally would not be considered 
to be excludable, because the proposals would transcend the 
day-to-day business matters and raise policy issues so sig-
nificant that it would be appropriate for a shareholder vote.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
52 Trinity, 792 F.3d at 347. 
53 Id. at 348. 
54 Id. (citing Apache Corp. v. New York City Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 621 F. 
Supp. 2d 444, 451 n.7 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (expressing skepticism towards “pro-
posals dealing with ordinary business matters yet cabined in social policy 
concern”)). Though there is generally a dearth of cases in the area, the nov-
elty of this second step is portrayed by the Third Circuit’s reaching down to 
the Southern District of Texas for a supportive precedent (in the form of a 
footnote). 
55 See SEC, Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, 48 Fed. Reg. 38218, 
38220–21 (Aug. 23, 1983) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
56 Trinity, 792 F.3d at 347. 
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discriminatory hiring—considered the prototypical exception 
post-Cracker Barrel—from proposals related to the goods re-
tailers sell.57 While employment questions undoubtedly relate 
to ordinary business matters,58 they are not the “core” or “es-
sence” of what any given company does.59 The majority’s in-
terpretation appears to create a bright-line rule stating that 
any proposal that ultimately may affect a retailer’s product 
matrix will be excludable, regardless of whether it touches on 
issues of significant social policy. This bright-line approach 
evokes the SEC’s disavowed approach in Cracker Barrel.60 
That similarity—a fact that is the focus of Judge Shwartz’s 
concurrence and the basis for her decision to concur only in 
judgment.61 
3. The Concurrence’s Disagreement  
Judge Shwartz rejects the step-two “transcendence” re-
quirement that the majority imposed. First, she argues that 
“[the majority’s] reading is inconsistent with the plain text of 
the 1998 Adopting Release.”62 In that release—which re-
versed the categorical approach taken in Cracker Barrel—the 
Commission stated,  
[P]roposals relating to [ordinary business] matters but 
focusing on sufficiently significant social policy issues 
(e.g. significant discrimination matters) generally 
would not be considered to be excludable, because the 
proposals would transcend the day-to-day business 
 
57 Id. 
58 See, e.g., SEC, Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, 48 Fed. Reg. 
38218, 38220–21 (Aug. 23, 1983) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
59 Trinity, 792 F.3d at 347. 
60 See, e.g., SEC, Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63 
Fed. Reg. 29106, 29108 (May 28, 1998); see also Cracker Barrel, supra note 
23, at *1. 
61 See generally id. at 323 (Shwartz, J. concurring). 
62 Id. at 352 (Shwartz, J. concurring). 
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matters and raise policy issues so significant that it 
would be appropriate for a shareholder vote.63 
She argues that “this passage makes clear [that] whether 
a proposal focuses on an issue of social policy that is suffi-
ciently significant is not separate and distinct from whether 
the proposal transcends a company’s ordinary business. Ra-
ther, a proposal is sufficiently significant ‘because’ it trans-
cends day-to-day business matters.”64 Further, she points to 
“the 1998 Adopting Release [that] expressly permits a share-
holder to submit a proposal that relates directly to ordinary 
business matters, including ‘decisions on production quality 
and quantity, and the retention of suppliers,’ so long as it ‘fo-
cus[es] on’ sufficiently significant social policy issues.”65 In-
deed, to the extent that the majority believed certain ordinary 
business matters may never be the subject of a shareholder 
proposal regardless of the social issues involved, Judge 
Shwartz casts a skeptical eye on its interpretation. 
Nevertheless, Judge Shwartz concurs in the judgment be-
cause she believes that Trinity’s proposal does not touch on 
issues of sufficiently significant social policy,66 which the ma-
jority previously argued was the case in its “step one” analy-
sis.67 Trinity’s proposal directs the board to form a committee 
tasked with creating policies and standards for determining 
whether Wal-Mart should continue to sell a product that: (1) 
“especially endangers public safety and well-being”; (2) “has 
the substantial potential to impair” Wal-Mart’s reputation; 
and/or (3) “would reasonably be considered by many to be of-
fensive to the family and community values integral to” Wal-
Mart’s brand.68 Judge Shwartz states that the first component 
 
63 SEC, Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63 Fed. Reg. 
29106, 29108 (May 28, 1998). 
64 Trinity, 792 F.3d at 353 (Shwartz, J. concurring) (quoting SEC, 
Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63 Fed. Reg. 29106, 29108 
(May 28, 1998)). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 354 (Shwartz, J. concurring). 
67 Id. at 345. 
68 Id. at 354 (Shwartz, J. concurring). 
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may raise a significant issue of social policy, to the extent it 
touches on the sale of high capacity firearms, but the other 
two do not; therefore, the proposal as a whole does not focus 
on such an issue.69  
The critical implication is that had Trinity Wall-Street cab-
ined its proposal to concerns about public safety, and not men-
tioned the reputation or values of Wal-Mart, it would be able 
to avail itself of the significant social policy exception.70  
Thus, Judge Shwartz takes a fundamentally different view 
of the social policy exception from that held by the majority. 
The majority, in a return to Cracker Barrel-esque categorical 
exclusions, permitted exclusion of all product-related pro-
posals put to a retailer by creating a “transcendence” test on 
top of the significant social policy exception. In their view, 
touching significant social policy issues does not automati-
cally prove that a proposal goes beyond ordinary business con-
cerns. Judge Shwartz, by contrast, adheres to the 1998 stand-
ard the Commission articulated in its rejection of Cracker 
Barrel: When a proposal touches issues of sufficiently signifi-
cant social policy, it may not be excluded for its relation to or-
dinary business matters. In her view, there is no additional 
step requiring “transcendence.” The Division appears to agree 
with Judge Shwartz on this point. 
B. Staff Bulletin 14H: Non-binding Response to 
Trinity  
On October 22, 2015—only 108 days after the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision—the staff within the SEC’s Division of Corpo-
rate Finance issued a Legal Bulletin in response.71 Though 
“not a rule, regulation or statement of the [SEC],” Bulletin 
 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 354 (“Thus, while the first component of Trinity’s proposal may 
raise a significant issue of social policy, insofar as it touches on the sale of 
guns equipped with high capacity magazines, we cannot say the proposal as 
a whole ‘focus[es] on’ such an issue.”). 
71 SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H (Oct. 22, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14h.htm [perma.cc /AKR3-4S9X] 
[hereinafter Bulletin 14H]. 
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14H does “represent the views of the Division,” which is 
charged with making enforcement recommendations under 
Rule 14a-8.72 Because proposal omissions based on no-action 
letters are very rarely challenged in court or elevated for fur-
ther SEC review, the memo represents the de facto legal 
standard for applying Rule 14a-8(i)(7).  
The Division first agreed that the District Court improp-
erly focused on the form, rather than the underlying subject 
matter, of the proposal’s request when identifying whether 
the proposal related to Wal-Mart’s ordinary business opera-
tions.73  
It then recognized the majority’s departure from the Com-
mission’s stance on the social policy exception, saying, “The 
majority opinion employed a new two-part test . . . This two-
part approach differs from the Commission’s statements on 
the ordinary business exclusion and Division practice.”74 The 
Division rejected their innovation and endorsed Judge 
Shwartz’s reading of the 1998 Adopting Release, which argued 
“whether a proposal focuses on an issue of social policy that is 
sufficiently significant is not separate and distinct from 
whether the proposal transcends a company’s ordinary busi-
ness. Rather, a proposal is sufficiently significant ‘because’ it 
transcends day-to-day matters.”75 The Division explained that 
it was “concerned that the new analytical approach introduced 
by the Third Circuit goes beyond the Commission’s prior state-
ments and may lead to unwarranted exclusion of shareholder 
proposals.”76 More explicitly, the Division believed that “a pro-





75 See id. (quoting 792 F.3d 323, 353 (3d Cir. 2015) (Shwartz, J., con-
curring)) (“The Division intends to continue to apply Rule 14a-8(i)(7) as ar-
ticulated by the Commission and consistent with the Division’s prior appli-
cation of the exclusion, as endorsed by the concurring judge . . . . ”). 
76 Id. 
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operations even if the significant policy issue relates to the 
‘nitty-gritty of its core business.”77  
The memo concluded by saying the Division “intends to 
continue to apply Rule 14a-8(i)(7) as articulated by the Com-
mission and consistent with the Division’s prior application of 
the exclusion, as endorsed by the concurring judge . . . .”78  
The statement can be seen as contradictory or at least am-
biguous because Judge Shwartz did not endorse the position 
articulated in the no-action letter the Division issued to Wal-
Mart. Recall that it found that Wal-Mart had a basis to ex-
clude the proposal under 14a-8(i)(7) because “[p]roposals con-
cerning the sale of particular products and services are gener-
ally excludable under [the rule].”79 Judge Shwartz was 
unconcerned by the proposal’s ultimate effect on Wal-Mart’s 
product matrix, and permitted the proposal’s exclusion “be-
cause it lack[ed] the focus needed to trigger the ‘significant 
social policy’ exception.”80 As discussed in Section II.A.3, she 
strongly implies that the proposal would not be excludable if 
it only retained its “public safety” component.81 In effect, she 
calls for greater focus on firearm products and public safety, 
which would contradict the Division’s position in its no-action 
letter.  
Thus, the Division’s statement that it “intends to continue 
to apply Rule 14a-8(i)(7) . . . as endorsed by the concurring 
 
77 Id. Note also the use of the majority’s terminology from its “tran-
scendence” test. 
78 Id. (emphasis added). 
79 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 409085, at *1 
(Mar. 20, 2014). That conclusion echoes the Trinity majority’s reasoning and 
makes no mention of the significant social policy exception, instead focusing 
on the parts of ordinary business the proposal touches. See Trinity Wall 
Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 347 (3d Cir. 2015) (asserting 
proposals should be “divorced from how a company approaches the nitty-
gritty of its core business”). 
80 Trinity, 792 F.3d at 354 (Shwartz, J. concurring). 
81 Id. (“Thus, while the first component of Trinity’s proposal may raise 
a significant issue of social policy, insofar as it touches on the sale of guns 
equipped with high capacity magazines, we cannot say the proposal as a 
whole ‘focus[es] on’ such an issue.”). 
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judge” appears to contradict its position in the Wal-Mart No-
Action Letter.82  
C. Conflicting Positions: De Jure Precedent and De 
Facto Control  
The three positions discussed above conflict with each 
other, and none clearly control because the vast majority of 
exclusion decisions are made by the Division, as opposed to 
courts within the Third Circuit. 
The Trinity majority has fashioned a new test designed to 
exclude proposals that touch on significant social policy issues 
but attempt to exert control over the company’s core business.  
Judge Shwartz argues that touching a sufficiently signifi-
cant issue of social policy is enough to overcome the ordinary 
business exclusion, regardless of whether the proposal regu-
lates the company’s “core business.”  
The Division occupies a third position, at least to the extent 
that there is ambiguity in Bulletin 14H. It clearly rejects the 
Trinity majority’s new “transcendence” test as inconsistent 
with the language of the 1998 Adopting Release and the rule’s 
prior application. But it is unclear whether it adopts Judge 
Shwartz’s position in full, which contradicts the Division’s po-
sition in its Wal-Mart No-Action Letter. Judge Shwartz’s rea-
soning expands the scope of the social policy exception beyond 
what the Division previously allowed. Thus, the Division may 
now sit somewhere between the majority and Judge Shwartz, 
neither expanding nor contracting its pattern of practice.83  
The Trinity majority’s position is the only stance that has 
binding effect in law. It controls courts within the Third Cir-
cuit and has the potential to shape an untouched area of law 
in the other circuits, as evidenced in part by the Third 
 
82 Bulletin 14H, supra note 71. 
83 Though the Division purports to apply the exclusion on a case-by-
case basis, at least one author has recently argued that the exclusion’s ap-
plication has been “rulified” internally and implicitly. See Reilly Steel, Note, 
The Underground Rulification of the Ordinary Business Exclusion, 116 
COLUM. L. REV. 1547 (2016). 
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Circuit’s reference to a Southern District of Texas decision on 
the matter.84 Indeed, its influence was significant enough to 
warrant an official Legal Bulletin on the matter, of which 
there have only been eight others.85 
But litigation under any substantive exception in Rule 
14a-8(i) is incredibly rare.86 While the Trinity majority’s posi-
tion may control its lower courts and be persuasive to others, 
the bulk of determinations are made by the Division when a 
company seeks a no-action letter.87 Further, the Commission 
is reluctant to formally speak on the issue, as evidenced by the 
almost two decades since the 1998 Adopting Release on 14a-
8(i)(7). This gives the Division incredible control over the in-
terpretation and application of Rule 14a-8. Therefore, deci-
phering Bulletin 14H to identify the Division’s position on the 
rule is critical.  
IV. DATA-DRIVEN ANSWERS FOR IDENTIFYING 
THE STATE OF THE SOCIAL POLICY EXCEPTION 
This Note argues that Trinity and Bulletin 14H have cre-
ated a conflict in interpretation of Rule 14a-8(i)(7), or more 
specifically, two conflicts. First, the Third Circuit’s controlling 
law is now in conflict with the stated position of the Commis-
sion and the Division. But more importantly, the Division’s 
present position is potentially in conflict with its pre-Trinity 
 
84 Trinity, 792 F.3d at 347 (citing Apache Corp. v. New York City 
Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 621 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 n.7 (S.D. Tex. 2008)). 
85 See Staff Legal Bulletins, SEC https://www.sec.gov/interps/le-
gal.shtml [perma.cc/4UBW-4SVF] (listing the nine legal bulletins covering 
the whole of Rule 14a-8 dating back to 1992). 
86 A search in Westlaw of all § 240.14a-8(i) references in federal deci-
sions yields only twenty-two cases, eighteen of which were reported. See 
WESTLAW, http://1.next.westlaw.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (search 
“240.14a-8(i)” without quotation marks, then filter by “Cases”). 
87 A search in Westlaw for all no-action letters issued that reference a 
substantive exception under Rule 14a-8(i) yields almost 7000 results dating 
back to 1970. See WESTLAW, http://1.next.westlaw.com (last visited Oct. 18, 
2017) (under “All Content” select “Administrative Decisions & Guidance,” 
then under “Federal” select “Securities & Exchange Commission” then “No-
Action Letters” and finally under “All of these terms” search “14a-8(i)”). 
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interpretation of the social policy exception. Part IV proposes 
a way of resolving the ambiguity in Bulletin 14H—by looking 
not at the Division’s words but its actions—to determine 
whether the social policy exception has changed to be the more 
expansive version discussed by Judge Shwartz.  
A. Methodological Approach  
1. Hypothesis and Propositions  
This Note tests the following hypothesis: The Division, in 
endorsing Judge Shwartz’s concurrence, has adopted a 
broader view of the social policy exception than it previously 
held. As previously noted, Judge Shwartz’s view of the social 
policy exception can be read as broader than that in the Divi-
sion’s Wal-Mart No-Action Letter, and can be read as signifi-
cantly broader than that of the Trinity majority.88 If this hy-
pothesis is true, several propositions should follow.  
Proposition 1: The combined effect of Trinity and Bul-
letin 14H should result in a decrease in the rate at 
which the Division grants no-action requests and an 
increase in the rate at which the Division denies no-
action requests.  
There is a negative relationship between the number of no-
action requests granted which might implicate 14a-8(i)(7) and 
the degree to which the Division agrees with Judge Shwartz. 
Judge Shwartz would not omit the proposal for attempting to 
influence the sale of particular products, and the Division said 
that such proposals were excludable under the ordinary busi-
ness exclusion prior to Trinity. Judge Shwartz therefore 
adopts a more expansive view of the social policy exception 
than the Division had held prior to issuing Bulletin 14H. If 
Bulletin 14H represents a change in the Division’s interpreta-
tion of the exception—and the ambiguity in its endorsement 
of the concurrence indicates that it might—then there would 
 
88 See supra Section II.C. 
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be an increase in the denial of no-action letters for companies 
seeking 14a-8(i)(7) exclusion.  
Proposition 2: The negative effect on companies seek-
ing no-action letters from a perceived more expansive 
interpretation by the Division adopted in Bulletin 14H 
will outweigh the positive effect on company conduct 
and result in a decrease in the rate at which they seek 
no-action letters. 
There is a positive relationship between the power that 
companies believe the majority opinion has and the rate at 
which these companies seek no-action letters from the Divi-
sion. Both the Division and Judge Shwartz agree that the 
Trinity majority creates an additional requirement for pro-
posals that touch on issues of significant social policy. This re-
quirement therefore narrows the kinds of proposals that qual-
ify for the exception. Though the effect might be small, 
companies should feel more confident in their ability to ex-
clude proposals than they would if Trinity had not occurred. 
The decision to seek a no-action letter is in part a function of 
the company’s confidence in a favorable result. Therefore, 
companies will be more likely to seek no-action letters from 
the Division when they believe Trinity has persuasive force. 
There is also a negative relationship between the degree to 
which companies believe the Division adopts a more expan-
sive view of the social policy exception after Bulletin 14H and 
the rate at which companies seek no-action letters from the 
Division. It costs companies money to request a no-action let-
ter from the Division; companies are also required to put forth 
the basis for their belief that a proposal may be omitted. All 
else equal, if they are less likely to succeed in excluding a pro-
posal under 14a-8(i)(7), then they would be less likely to seek 
a no-action letter in the first place.  
Proposition 3: The combined effect of Trinity and Bul-
letin 14H will result in both more social policy-related 
proposals being brought as well as increase their 
share of all proposals brought by shareholders. 
POULIOT_FINAL   
310 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
 
There is a positive relationship between the number of so-
cial-policy-related proposals brought by shareholders and the 
degree to which shareholders believe the Division agrees with 
Judge Shwartz’s opinion. Shareholders are limited to suggest-
ing one proposal per annual meeting. If a shareholder values 
two possible proposals equally, the shareholder will prefer to 
bring the one more likely to succeed. Shareholders now have 
a basis for believing that the Division has adopted a more ex-
pansive interpretation of the social policy exception. They also 
have a basis for believing that courts will be less likely to find 
that a proposal qualifies for the social policy exception. But, 
recognizing that the exception is so rarely litigated, share-
holders are more likely post-Bulletin 14H to believe that their 
social policy-related proposals will be included in a company’s 
proxy statement. This belief will likely result in a shift away 
from other types of proposals towards social policy-related 
proposals, as well as an increase in the number of proposals 
brought by shareholders who would not otherwise submit one. 
It may be that changes consistent with the above proposi-
tions cannot be identified using currently available infor-
mation. But it is the author’s hope that, by stating the propo-
sitions that should follow from the hypothesis and exploring 
the available data in detail, future studies can better model 
the actors’ behavior. This Note further seeks to provide guid-
ance in a period of increasing activism by at least identifying 
whether large shifts in position have followed in the wake of 
an unprecedented circuit decision and agency response. 
2. Data Set 
In order to analyze the behavior of shareholders, compa-
nies, and the Division following Trinity and Bulletin 14H, this 
Note relies on a robust dataset provided by FactSet Research 
Systems Inc., specifically its SharkRepellent data on proxy 
proposals.89 The SharkRepellent database provides some of 
 
89 The database may be accessed online at SHARKREPELLENT.NET, 
http://www.sharkrepellent.net [perma.cc/8GRA-44L7] (provided by FactSet 
Research Systems to subscribers). 
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the most comprehensive and up-to-date data on proxy pro-
posals, which makes it ideal for statistical and econometric 
analysis. 
The FactSet tool tracks every proposal submitted under 
Rule 14a-8, whether no-action was sought and granted, the 
outcome of the proposal, and the breakdown of “For” votes 
when the proposal was put to a vote. Further, FactSet has a 
robust categorization scheme for the proposals’ subject mat-
ter, and details the criteria used to do that categorization. A 
summary of the search parameters used to pull the dataset 
and the variables included for each observation—i.e., pro-
posal—is available in the Appendix to this Note.90 
3. Limitations of the Data  
This Note recognizes the data’s inherent limitations for the 
ultimate project of observing the effects of Trinity and Bulle-
tin 14H. Specifically, this data has two key limitations. First, 
SharkRepellent erratically tracks the date that a proxy state-
ment was filed with the SEC, so a before-and-after analysis of 
Trinity/Bulletin 14H’s effects must rely on the shareholder 
meeting date as an imperfect way to separate proposals across 
time. This effect is somewhat mitigated by the proxy season 
being largely over by October, when Bulletin 14H was re-
leased. However, because proxy proposals must be submitted 
no later than 120 days before the date the proxy statement is 
to be released, itself typically filed within one-to-two months 
of the annual meeting, there may be a lag in the response to 
Bulletin 14H for proposals voted on in the early 2016 meet-
ings.91 Because companies can file their objections no more 
than 80 days ahead of filing the proxy statement, there should 
be less lag in their behavior.92  
The second limitation relates to using FactSet’s proposal 
categorization by subject matter to separate the proposals to 
which Trinity might apply from the rest. It is imperfect in that 
 
90 See Table A1, Appendix, infra. 
91 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2017). 
92 Id. 
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it does not rely on the content of no-action requests and an-
swers to see if 14a-8(i)(7) was raised or accepted as a basis for 
exclusion. While that data would not perfectly categorize 
every proposal, its absence will require reliance on FactSet’s 
categories and an unsophisticated binary answer from the Di-
vision—either a grant or denial of the no-action request.  
A related, arguably-limiting third issue is that there is only 
a single year’s worth of post-Trinity/Bulletin 14H data to work 
with. While more data is always better, a year is arguably suf-
ficient time for sophisticated parties to alter their behavior 
and there are a significant number of proposals from the 2015 
proxy season to draw inferences from. Despite these limita-
tions, the conclusions drawn from the SharkRepellant proxy 
data may still prove informative. 
4. Sorting the Data  
SharkRepellent returned 3471 unique proposals for which 
results were disclosed using the parameters listed in Table A1 
(Appendix A).93 Using FactSet’s provided subcategory criteria 
and sub-subcategory labels, the author separated the data 
into two groups: Control and Analysis.94 The Control group 
includes only the types of proposals unlikely to implicate the 
significant social policy exception, whereas the Analysis group 
contains only proposal types likely to implicate the significant 
social policy exception.95 This sorting is critical for an effective 
 
93 The original dataset included 16,458 proposals. A significant portion 
of those were duplicates and were removed using Microsoft Excel 2016’s 
“Data > Remove Duplicates function.” For details on the function, see Filter 
for Unique Values or Remove Duplicate Values, MICROSOFT, https://sup-
port.office.com/en-us/article/Filter-for-unique-values-or-remove-duplicate-
values-ccf664b0-81d6-449b-bbe1-8daaec1e83c2 [perma.cc/P665-76WP]. 
That number was reduced to 3471 unique proposals for which results were 
disclosed. 
94 See Proposal Types, SHARKREPELLENT.NET https://www.sharkrepel-
lent.net/pub/proposal_types.xls (last visited Feb. 23, 2018). All sorting and 
categorization was done prior to any statistical analysis and with no 
knowledge of what the results would be. 
95 There may be overlap in the appearance of Categories and Subcate-
gories in both groups. This is due to sorting based on the sub-subcategories 
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before-and-after analysis, and serves to control for the influ-
ence of outside forces on exclusion decisions. Any change in 
the Analysis group not reflected in the Control group will be 
much more likely attributable to a change in the Division’s 
position, reflected in Bulletin 14H.  
 
TABLE 1: CONTROL GROUP CATEGORIES AND SUBCATEGORIES 
 
Category Subcategory 
Capitalization Capital Stock 
Corporate Governance Board Related, 
Executive Compensation Related, 
Miscellaneous Corporate Governance, 
Reincorporate in Another State, 
Shareholder Rights/Takeover  
Defense 
Proxy Fight Specific Proxy Fight Specific 
Value Maximization Value Maximization 
 
TABLE 2: ANALYSIS GROUP CATEGORIES AND SUBCATEGORIES 
 
Category Subcategory 
Corporate Governance Board Related, 
Executive Compensation Related, 




Social Issues Related, 
Environmental Issues Related 
Value Maximization Value Maximization 
 
Sorting based on sub-subcategories for the relevant period 
yielded a Control group containing 1984 proposals that were 
 
provided by FactSet and a reading of the close-case proposals’ actual text. 
For a complete list of the sub-subcategories used and which group they were 
sorted into, see infra Tables A3 and A4, Appendix. 
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unlikely to relate to Trinity, and an Analysis group containing 
1485 proposals that were likely to relate to Trinity.96  
Imperfections in the dataset meant that approximately 
forty values, spread across three variables, were missing. The 
blank fields for “Market Cap” and “Pill In Force” were given 
zero values, and blanks for “State of Incorporation” were 
treated as “Not Delaware.” Given the total number of pro-
posals compared to the few with incomplete data, these small 
changes are unlikely to affect this Note’s conclusions but were 
necessary for particular analyses.  
B. Data Analysis 
1. Did the Division Grant No-Action Relief at a 
Lower Rate After Bulletin 14H? 
Analysis Group. A comparison of proposals whose meet-
ings occurred before or on the date the Division issued Bulle-
tin 14H reveals mixed results depending on a proposal’s sub-
category, but higher rates in granting no-action relief. This 
result is contrary to the proposition that no-action relief would 















96 Eight proposals for which results were not disclosed were removed 
after being sorted into one of the two groups. 
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TABLE 3. NUMBER OF NO-ACTION REQUESTS GRANTED AS 
PERCENTAGE OF REQUESTS MADE WITHIN CATEGORY AND 














Corporate Governance 77.4% 62.7% 81.6% 73.8% 
Board Related 57.1% 33.3% 66.7% 66.7% 
Executive Compensation Related 35.7% 29.4% 33.3% 33.3% 
Miscellaneous Corporate  
Governance 
85.1% 70.8% 87.0% 77.8% 
Miscellaneous 82.0% 80.4% 87.5% 87.5% 
Miscellaneous 82.0% 80.4% 87.5% 87.5% 
Social/Environmental Issues 47.5% 19.2% 46.0% 13.1% 
Environmental Issues Related 37.1% 16.7% 34.5% 11.6% 
Social Issues Related 52.2% 20.3% 53.3% 13.9% 
Value Maximization 100.0% 80.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Value Maximization 100.0% 80.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of All Categories 57.0% 27.4% 60.3% 23.6% 
 
Overall, no-action relief was more frequently granted after 
Bulletin 14H for proposals that potentially implicated the so-
cial policy exception (~3.5% more frequent across categories). 
No-action relief was slightly less frequent (~1.5% less fre-
quent) for the individual subcategories of Social Issues and 
Environmental Issues. The difference in those categories post-
Bulletin 14H is greater when looking at no-action relief 
granted as a proportion of all proposals brought within that 
category (~6%).  
In the aggregate, the overall increase in no-action letters 
issued would seem to indicate that the Division has not 
changed its position, contrary to the proposition drawn from 
the Note’s hypothesis.97 However, independent factors may be 
working against the proposed negative relationship between 
 
97 See supra Section III.A.1. 
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no-action requests granted and the degree to which the Divi-
sion adopts Judge Shwartz’s position.  
First, the decrease in no-action letters issued for the Social 
Issues and Environmental Issues subcategories may indicate 
either a gradual or small change in the Division’s position. 
These are the proposals most likely to implicate the social pol-
icy exception out of the entire Analysis group which to some 
degree relates to Trinity. A change in these subcategories may 
indicate that a gradual shift in position occurred for the pro-
posals most clearly within the scope of 14a-8(i)(7) and the so-
cial policy exception.  
However, if that were the case, one would expect to see a 
shift of shareholders bringing more proposals in the Social Is-
sues & Environmental Issues subcategories. This does not ap-
pear to be the case.98 A difference of ~0.4%, or one proposal of 
the 310 brought after Bulletin 14H, certainly does not indicate 
a strategic shift towards the subcategories, suggesting that 
shareholders may not view the Division as adopting a more 
expansive interpretation of the exception. This assumes that 
the Social/Environmental Issues category is most likely to be 
affected by a broader interpretation of the social policy excep-
tion out of those within the Analysis group, and that share-
holders are responsive to marginal changes in the Division’s 
position.  
 
TABLE 4. DISTRIBUTION OF PROPOSALS BROUGHT BY SUBCAT-
EGORY, BEFORE AND AFTER BULLETIN 14H (ANALYSIS) 
 
Proposal Subcategory Before 14H After 14H Total 
Board Related 1.02% 0.97% 1.01% 
Environmental Issues 23.49% 27.74% 24.38% 
Executive Compensation Related 1.45% 0.97% 1.35% 
Miscellaneous 4.34% 2.58% 3.97% 
Miscellaneous Corporate Governance 9.62% 11.61% 10.03% 
Social Issues Related 59.66% 55.81% 58.86% 
Value Maximization 0.43% 0.32% 0.40% 
 
98 For a more specific breakdown by subcategory, see infra Table A5, 
Appendix. 
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Table 4 captured the behavior of shareholders by identify-
ing the relative percentages of proposal types that they 
brought. But there is an intermediary between the share-
holder and the Division: the company. Because it is the com-
pany that makes the decision of whether to seek a no-action 
letter, their behavior will influence the types of proposals 
brought before the Division. Table 5, infra, captures compa-
nies’ behavior across subcategories. 
 
TABLE 5. DISTRIBUTION OF PROPOSALS AMONG  
SUBCATEGORIES, BEFORE AND AFTER BULLETIN 14H AND 
BY WHETHER A COMPANY SOUGHT NO ACTION FROM THE DI-
VISION (ANALYSIS) 
 
Meeting Before or On Bulletin 14H? Yes No 
No Action Sought? Yes No Yes No 
Board Related  1.2% 0.8% 2.5% 0.0% 
Environmental Issues  22.0% 24.9% 24.0% 30.2% 
Executive Compensation 2.5% 0.5% 2.5% 0.0% 
Miscellaneous 8.9% 0.2% 6.6% 0.0% 
Misc. Corporate Governance 16.6% 3.1% 26.5% 2.1% 
Social Issues Related 48.1% 70.3% 37.2% 67.7% 
Value Maximization 0.7% 0.2% 0.8% 0.0% 
 
Table 5 shows a notable shift by companies seeking no-ac-
tion relief away from Social Issues Related proposals (of 
~11%). The shift is made up almost entirely by the ~10% in-
crease in share for Miscellaneous Corporate Governance is-
sues and a slight (~2%) uptick in Environmental Issues. The 
Division’s no-action grants laid out in Table 3 show little 
change in how they treat Social and Environmental Issues.99 
The shareholders’ proposal distribution in Table 4 show even 
smaller movement to the Social and Environmental Issues 
subcategories.100 Yet, companies seek no-action less fre-
quently for those issues now as compared to other issues. No-
 
99 See supra Table 3. 
100 See supra Table 4. 
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action grant rates are about the same for those issues, as is 
their share of all proposals brought, which might indicate that 
movements elsewhere in securities law are compelling compa-
nies to more aggressively seek no-action relief in other areas.  
Second, as will be discussed in detail in Section III.B.2, in-
fra, companies sought no-action relief less frequently in the 
Analysis group, which may indicate a belief that a challenge 
to those proposals would be less likely to succeed. That would 
be consistent with the Proposition 1 that the Division has 
adopted Judge Shwartz’s more expansive view of the social 
policy exception. 
Third, there may be a general trend within the Division 
across all types of proposals to favor companies and issue 
them no-action letters regardless of a proposal’s content. The 
Control group’s results support this idea to some degree. 
Control Group. A similar comparison within the Control 
group shows comparable results, with an increase in no-action 
letters issued but a decrease in their number as a percentage 
of all proposals submitted for proxy inclusion. 
 
TABLE 6. NUMBER OF NO-ACTION REQUESTS GRANTED AS 
PERCENTAGE OF REQUESTS MADE WITHIN CATEGORY AND 













Capitalization 100.0% 100.0% 
  
Capital Stock 100.0% 100.0% 
  
Corporate Governance 50.5% 19.34% 62.9% 17.9% 
Board Related 47.2% 15.8% 44.4% 5.6% 
Executive Compensation Related 48.5% 22.1% 28.6% 9.7% 




Reincorporate in Another State 50.0% 16.7% 
  
Shareholder Rights /  
Takeover Defense 
53.6% 20.0% 76.1% 24.6% 
Proxy Fight Specific  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Proxy Fight Specific  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Value Maximization 88.2% 60.0% 25.0% 13.0% 
Value Maximization 88.2% 60.0% 25.0% 13.0% 
% of All Categories 51.7% 20.0% 58.2% 17.5% 
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Overall, there is a more dramatic increase here in the num-
ber of no-action letters granted after Bulletin 14H was issued 
(~6.5% vs. ~3.5% in Analysis). This change occurred despite a 
similar decline in no-action letters issued as a proportion of 
all proposals submitted for proxy statement inclusion (~2.5% 
vs. ~4% in Analysis).  
However, the Control group only includes proposals Bulle-
tin 14H should not affect because they do not implicate the 
social policy exception.101 If that presumption holds, then the 
changes observed in the Analysis group—which track the 
changes shown here in the Control group—might not negate 
Proposition 1 (though they couldn’t be taken to support it, ei-
ther).  
Using regression tools to analyze the same data,102 the fol-
lowing model (“Proposition 1 Model”) also tends to disprove 








101 There is some concern that Bulletin 14H’s discussion of the Rule 
14a-8(i)(9) exclusion for conflict with the company’s own proposal may be 
causing changes in the Control group, which otherwise should remain un-
changed by the bulletin. See Bulletin 14H, supra note 71. The data used are 
insufficient to isolate those potential effects. 
102 A full description of the methodology used to select variables for in-
clusion, as well as tests reporting goodness of fit, overall significance, and 
predictive ability is provided in the Appendix, Part B, infra. 
103 Logistic regression is a means of isolating the effect of independent 
variables on the likelihood of an event occurring. The model is designed to 
maximize the likelihood of a correct prediction based on the independent 
variables chosen to explain some set of data. When the prediction is whether 
an event will occur, the regression will estimate the effect of the independ-
ent variables on the natural log-odds of that event occurring. Those esti-
mates can be transformed to provide the change in the odds that the event 
will occur for each change in the relevant independent variable. 
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Log likelihood = –2011.5598 













Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
MeetingBeforeor-
OnSECMemoDa 1.271 .1271 2.40 .017 1.04457 1.54599 
SubcatEnvironmen-
talIssues .1672 .0322 -9.29 .000 .114640 .243860 
SubcatSocialIs-
suesRelated .1459 .0253 -11.10 .000 .103889 .204993 
Subcat-
BoardRelated .0715 .0139 -13.57 .000 .048824 .104601 
SubcatExecu-
tiveCompensationR .1343 .0248 -10.87 .000 .093485 .192856 
SubcatReincorpo-
rateInAnother .0676 .0749 -2.43 .015 .007720 .592447 
SubcatShareholder-
RightsTakeo .1070 .0188 -12.74 .000 .075848 .150880 
SubcatValueMaxi-
mization .2355 .0752 -4.53 .000 .125869 .440474 
MarketCapitliza-
tionmil 1.000 .0000 5.20 .000 1.00000 1.00000 
_cons 2.305 .4114 4.68 .000 1.62490 3.27049 
 
Proposition 1 Model predicts that a proposal that was 
brought before or on the date of Bulletin 14H is 1.27x more 
likely to be excluded than proposals brought after Bulletin 
14H. This runs contrary to the proposition that expects pro-
posals are less likely to be excluded after Bulletin 14H, all else 
held equal. The range of the estimated effect is relatively 
large, being between 1.04x and 1.55x more likely. More than 
disconfirm the proposition, the model suggests Bulletin 14H 
had the opposite effect.  
The other variables yield interesting information as well. 
A proposal that falls into either the Environmental or Social 
Issues subcategory is significantly less likely to be excluded 
than are other proposals (~84% and ~86% less likely, 
POULIOT_FINAL   
No. 1:287] A TRINITY OF INTERPRETATIONS: 14A-8(I)(7) 321 
 
respectively),104 independent of whether the proposal oc-
curred before or after Bulletin 14H and the other factors 
listed. Though that fact is not useful for determining whether 
the Division’s position on the exception itself has changed, 
Proposition Model 1 does suggest that the significant social 
policy exception has some bite. 
Overall, the data do not support Proposition 1. If the Divi-
sion had adopted a more expansive view of the social policy 
exception when it issued Bulletin 14H, there ought to have 
been a decrease in the rate at which it granted no-action relief 
to companies on social policy-related issues. Based on the 
data, the opposite occurred. Because there were similar 
changes in both the Control and Analysis groups—after an 
event (Bulletin 14H), which in theory should only influence 
one—it is possible that external forces not captured by these 
variables worked against the hypothesized effect. Neverthe-
less, there is insufficient evidence on the issue to conclude that 
the Division changed its interpretation post-Trinity. The re-
gression results, at a minimum, confirm this conclusion.  
2. Did Companies Seek Fewer No-Action Letters 
for Trinity-related Proposals? 
Proposition 2 theorized that the negative effect on compa-
nies seeking no-action letters from a perceived more-expan-
sive interpretation by the Division adopted in Bulletin 14H 
would outweigh the positive effect of the Trinity majority’s 
view and result in a decrease in the rate at which they seek 
no-action letters.  
Analysis Group. There is an observable decrease in the 
rate at which companies sought a no-action letter. Post-Bulle-
tin 14H, for proposals in the Analysis group, companies only 
sought no-action relief 39% of the time. In contrast, prior to 
Bulletin 14H, companies requested no-action from the Divi-
sion ~48% of the time. The previous discussion touched on the 
 
104 Alternatively, this can be written as: All proposals except for those 
that touch on Environmental or Social Policy Issues are collectively 5.98x or 
6.85x more likely to be excluded, respectively. 
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differences, namely, a large drop in Social/Environmental Is-
sues, made up only in part by an increase in the Corporate 
Governance category.  
 
TABLE 8. PERCENTAGE AND COUNT WITHIN CATEGORY 
WHERE NO-ACTION SOUGHT, BY BEFORE/ON OR AFTER  
BULLETIN 14H (ANALYSIS) 
  
Before 14H After 14H 
% within Category 
for which  
No-Action Sought # 
% within Category 
for which  
No-Action Sought # 
Corporate Governance 81.0% 115 90.5% 38 
Board Related 58.3% 7 100.0% 3 
Executive Compensation  82.4% 14 100.0% 3 
Misc. Corp. Governance 83.2% 94 88.9% 32 
Miscellaneous 98.0% 50 100.0% 8 
Miscellaneous 98.0% 50 100.0% 8 
Social/ 
Environmental Issues 
40.5% 396 28.6% 74 
Environmental Issues 44.9% 124 33.7% 29 
Social Issues  38.8% 272 26.0% 45 
Value Maximization 80.0% 4 100.0% 1 
Value Maximization 80.0% 4 100.0% 1 
Total of All Categories 48.1% 565 39.0% 121 
 
However, amongst the Analysis group categories, there 
has been an observable drop in the rate at which companies 
seek no-action relief, consistent with Proposition 2. That con-
sistency is further bolstered by the sizable shift away from So-
cial/Environmental issues. 
Control Group. The Control group experienced a similar 
decline post-Bulletin 14H in the rate at which companies 
sought no-action letters across categories. Much of the forego-
ing discussion on the Control group and the external forces 
acting on it may apply here. The decline is similar (~8.5% vs. 
~9% in Analysis), but here there is stronger evidence that ex-
ternal forces unrelated to Trinity account for the similar ef-
fects in both groups. The Analysis group’s dramatic drop for 
Social/Environmental issues indicates a responsiveness to 
Trinity, consistent with expectations. The Control group’s 
similarly dramatic drop came from the Board Related 
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subcategory, so it is less likely that Bulletin 14H is having an 
effect.105  
 
TABLE 9. PERCENTAGE AND COUNT WITHIN CATEGORY 
WHERE NO-ACTION SOUGHT, BY BEFORE/ON OR AFTER  
BULLETIN 14H (CONTROL) 
 
 Before 14H After 14H 
 
% within Category 
for which  
No-Action Sought # 
% within Category 
for which  
No-Action Sought # 
Capitalization 100.0% 2   
Capital Stock 100.0% 2   
Corporate Governance 38.4% 608 28.5% 97 
Board Related 33.5% 144 12.7% 9 
Executive Compensation 45.6% 196 33.9% 21 
Misc. Corp. Governance 11.1% 1 
  






37.3% 265 32.4% 67 
Proxy Fight Specific 0.00% 0 50.0% 1 
Proxy Fight Specific 0.00% 0 50.0% 1 
Value Maximization 68.0% 17 52.2% 12 
Value Maximization 68.0% 17 52.2% 12 
Total of All Categories 38.7% 627 30.1% 110 
 
Proposition 2 Model tends to affirm the proposition. The 
model predicts that a proposal is 1.53x more likely to be chal-
lenged before Bulletin 14H than after. Indirectly, this sup-
ports the idea that Bulletin 14H made successful challenges 
less likely (and therefore of reduced value) due to a more ex-
pansive interpretation of the social policy exception. 
Concededly, the available data do not provide a great 
means of evaluating the effect of Bulletin 14H on the number 
of no-action letters sought. It is an inherently difficult thing 
to measure, as it includes both the SEC’s actual position and 
 
105 Note that the Board Related subcategory appears in both the Anal-
ysis and Control groups. This Note separated proposals using sub-subcate-
gory sorting to ensure only those likely to be relevant to Trinity are put in 
the Analysis group. That should bolster the claim that external forces are 
causing comparable Control group effects, as extra care has been taken to 
isolate proposals in the Board Related subcategory from Trinity’s influence. 
See also infra Table A3, Appendix. 
POULIOT_FINAL   
324 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
 
companies’ response to their perception of that position, as 
well as the proposals written by shareholders observing the 
same.  
 
TABLE 10. PROPOSITION 2 MODEL & RESULTS  
(STATA LOGISTIC OUTPUT) 
 
Logistic Regression 
Log likelihood = –2166.1833 













Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
MeetingBeforeor-
OnSECMemoDa 1.532 .1470 4.44 .000 1.26915 1.84874 
SubcatEnvironmen-
talIssues .0121 .0123 -4.35 .000 .001653 .088267 
SubcatSocialIs-
suesRelated .0088 .0089 -4.68 .000 .001211 .063856 
Subcat-
BoardRelated .0077 .0078 -4.80 .000 .001059 .056282 
SubcatExecu-
tiveComepnsationR .0133 .0134 -4.27 .000 .001822 .096618 
SubcatMiscellane-
ousCorporate .0645 .0664 -2.66 .008 .008585 .485066 
SubcatProxyFight-
Specific .0024 .0035 -4.12 .000 .000136 .042319 
SubcatReincorpo-
rateInAnother .0096 .0128 -3.49 .000 .000709 .130163 
SubcatShareholder-
RightsTakeo .0102 .0103 -4.54 .000 .001404 .073944 
SubcatValueMaxi-
mization .0301 .0316 -3.34 .001 .003847 .235397 
MarketCapitaliza-
tionmil 1.000 .0000 9.05 .000 1.00000 1.00000 
_cons 33.41 33.82 3.47 .001 4.59426 242.965 
 
Overall, there is stronger evidence to support Proposition 
2 than there is for Proposition 1. A decline in seeking no-ac-
tion, particularly in the most relevant of the proposal catego-
ries, is consistent with companies holding a more pessimistic 
view of their chances for success in excluding proposals which 
may qualify for the social policy exception to Rule 14a-8(i)(7). 
This is dampened by a similarly strong effect in the Control 
group, but the subcategory distribution indicates that exter-
nal forces, not Bulletin 14H, are responsible. The regression 
analysis is consistent with that conclusion. It is clear that 
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companies seek no-action relief at a lower rate than before 
Bulletin 14H, and there’s evidence which arguably attributes 
that change to the Bulletin itself. 
3. Are There More Proposals both in Number and 
Proportional Share Which Relate to the Social 
Policy Exception? 
Raw counts of proposals are not very reliable in identifying 
causation. Nevertheless, the one-proposal rule does amplify 
the significance of any shift between categories year-to-year.  
When weighted for the length of the period, there appears 
to have been a small increase in the number of Analysis group 
proposals brought. This is consistent with the proposition that 
there would be an increase in the absolute number of social 
policy-related proposals post-Bulletin 14H due to the one-pro-
posal limit106 and the increased chance of success stemming 
from ambiguity in the Division’s position. 
 
TABLE 11. COUNT OF PROPOSALS BROUGHT WITHIN ANALY-
SIS GROUP, BROKEN OUT BY SUBCATEGORY  
(ANALYSIS) 
 







Day ∆ Per Day 
Corporate Governance 142 .102 42 .109 -0.007 
Board Related 12 .009 3 .008 0.001 
Executive Compensation 17 .012 3 .008 0.004 
Misc. Corp. Governance 113 .081 36 .094 -0.012 
Miscellaneous 51 .037 8 .021 0.016 
Miscellaneous 51 .037 8 .021 0.016 
Social/ 
Environmental Issues 
977 .703 259 .673 0.030 
Environmental Issues 276 .199 86 .223 -0.025 
Social Issues Related 701 .504 173 .449 0.055 
Value Maximization 5 .004 1 .003 0.001 
Value Maximization 5 .004 1 .003 0.001 
Total 1175 .845 310 .805 0.040 
 
 
106 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8. 
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The data in Table 12, infra, are also consistent with Prop-
osition 3, in that they show that proposals in the Analysis 
group occupy a greater share (~4% greater) of all proposals 
brought post-Bulletin 14H than they did prior. This fact sug-
gests that shareholders may have both perceived and re-
sponded to a change within Bulletin 14H by bringing more so-
cial policy-related proposals. The small change in the absolute 
number of proposals brought within the category likely indi-
cates that the increased share is due to a combination of a de-
crease in Control group proposals and a slight increase in 
Analysis group proposals.  
 
TABLE 12. COUNT OF PROPOSALS BROUGHT BY CONTROL 
OR ANALYSIS GROUP 
  
Control Analysis Analysis as % of Total Brought 
Before 14H 1619 1175 42.05% 
After 14H 365 310 45.93% 
Both 1984 1485 42.81% 
V. CONCLUSION 
Just as the language in Bulletin 14H ambiguously con-
veyed the Division’s interpretation of Rule 14a-8(i)(7), the be-
haviors of shareholders, companies, and the Division itself 
send ambiguous signals one year later. The goal of this Note 
was to analyze the actors’ behaviors and look to the Division’s 
application of the rule to find a possible de facto change in the 
law. Taken together, the before-and-after analyses do not con-
clusively suggest that a change in interpretation occurred. At 
a minimum, though the Trinity decision was unprecedented 
and yielded a similarly uncommon response from the Division, 
it appears that no radical change in the law occurred.  
If the Division’s position changed to become more expan-
sive post-Trinity, three propositions—subject to constraints 
and assumptions—should have held true. The Division should 
have granted a smaller share of no-action requests across 
Analysis categories than were granted before the decision. 
Companies should have sought fewer no-action letters for 
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Analysis group proposals. And finally, shareholders should 
have altered their behavior and brought more Analysis-cate-
gory proposals.  
The data discussed in Part IV contradict Proposition 1 re-
garding the Division’s behavior. There was an increase in the 
relative number of no-action letters granted after Bulletin 
14H for Analysis proposals. There was a comparable change 
in the Control group, meaning that at best, there is not yet 
evidence to support Proposition 1. There is some evidence to 
support the second and third hypotheses. Companies sought 
no-action relief for Analysis group proposals at lower rates 
than they had before Bulletin 14H. While Control group pro-
posals saw similar declines, the subcategory distribution pro-
vides support for the proposition that Bulletin 14H was re-
sponsible. The shift away from seeking no-action for 
Social/Environmental issues was significant—it differed from 
trends in other categories and indicated of a reading of Bulle-
tin 14H where the Division now holds a broader view of the 
social policy exception. Similarly, some evidence exists to sup-
port Proposition 3. More Analysis group proposals are being 
brought, both in absolute number and as a share of all pro-
posals brought, which is consistent with the theory that share-
holders read Bulletin 14H to indicate adoption of a broader 
social policy exception.  
Thus, there is evidence that two of the three actors in this 
system—shareholders and companies—believe that the Divi-
sion has shifted the law on Rule 14a-8(i)(7). But the Division’s 
behavior is what truly counts for defining the law, given its de 
facto control through no-action recommendations.  
Given the importance of the Proposition 1 relative to the 
other two propositions, it ultimately appears that the Division 
has not endorsed Judge Shwartz’s position and has not 
adopted a broader view of the social policy exception. As social 
activism through control over corporate governance grows and 
institutional investors begin to act with an eye towards chang-
ing securities law through litigation, the views of the Trinity 
majority and Judge Shwartz may return with persuasive 
force. For now, however, the Division’s position on the social 
policy exception appears unchanged.  
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TABLE A1. SHARKREPELLENT.NET PROXY SEARCH  
PARAMETERS 
 
Meeting Date 1/1/2012–11/10/2016 
Meeting Type Annual, Special, Written Consent 
Non US Companies Excluded 
Index (Current) All 
Rule 14a-8? Yes (Only) 
No-Action Letter Sought? All 
No-Action Letter Granted? All 
Proposals Not In The Proxy? Include 
Proxy Proposal Result? Fail, Not Voted On, Pass, Pend-
ing/Results Never Disclosed 






Proxy Fight Specific 
Value Maximization 
 
TABLE A2. SHARKREPELLENT.NET OBSERVATION VARIABLES 
State of Incorporation Proposal to Amend Bylaws 
FactSet Industry Proposal Text 
Market Capitalization ($ mil) No-Action Letter Sought 
Pill in Force - Time of Meeting No-Action Letter Granted 
Meeting Date Proposal Not in Proxy 
Proxy Statement Filing Date Proposal Result 
Proposal For as % Yes / No 
Proposal Category For as % Shares Out 
Proposal Subcategory108 For as % Votes Cast 
 
107 For an explanation of how FactSet defines these categories, see Pro-
posal Types, supra note 94. 
108 For an explanation of how FactSet defines these subcategories, see 
id. 
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TABLE A3. CONTROL GROUP SUB-SUBCATEGORIES 
Adopt Director Nominee Qualifications 
Advisory Vote on Compensation (“say on pay”) 
Allow Cumulative Voting 
Allow for or Decrease Requirement to Act by Written Consent 
Allow for or Decrease Requirement to Call Special Meetings 
Board Ability to Amend Bylaws Related (Reduce Defense) 
Breakup Company, Divest Assets/Divisions 
Cap/Restrict Executive Compensation 
Change Vote Requirement to Elect Directors to Majority from Plurality 
Declassify Board 
Eliminate Dual Class Structure (Unequal Voting) 
Eliminate Supermajority Requirements 
Hire Adviser to Evaluate Alternatives/Seek Sale or Liquidation of Com-
pany 
Link Pay/Equity Grants and Vesting to Performance (“payforperfor-
mance”) 
Opt out of State Takeover Statute 
Other Executive Compensation Issues 
Recoup Bonuses/Incentive Pay if Restatement/Discredited (“clawback”) 
Redeem or Require Shareholder Vote on Poison Pill 
Remove Director(s) 
Repeal Bylaw Amendments Adopted by Company During Proxy Fight 
Require Equity be Retained by Executives/Dirs. for Specified Period 
Return Capital to Shareholders (Dividends, Buybacks) 
Separate Chairman and CEO Positions/Independent Chairman 
Shareholder Nominee in Company Proxy (Proxy Access) 
Vote on/Limit Severance Agreements (“golden parachutes”) 
TABLE A4. ANALYSIS GROUP SUB-SUBCATEGORIES 





Increase Compensation Related Disclosure/Prepare Special Report 
Labor Issues 
Miscellaneous 
Other Board Committee Related 
Other Corporate Governance Issues 
Other Maximize Shareholder Value Related 
Other Social Issues Related 
Political Issues 
Sustainability Report 
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TABLE A5. DISTRIBUTION OF PROPOSALS ACROSS SUBCATEGO-
RIES, BEFORE AND AFTER BULLETIN 14H (ANALYSIS) 
 
Proposal Subcategory Before 14H After 14H Total 
Board Related 1.02% 0.97% 1.01% 
Environmental Issues 23.49% 27.74% 24.38% 
Executive Compensation 1.45% 0.97% 1.35% 
Miscellaneous 4.34% 2.58% 3.97% 
Misc. Corporate Governance 9.62% 11.61% 10.03% 
Social Issues Related 59.66% 55.81% 58.86% 
Value Maximization 0.43% 0.32% 0.40% 
 
TABLE A6. AVERAGE SIZE OF SUPPORT FOR PROPOSALS VOTED 
ON, RELATIVE TO SEC, BY TYPE OF VOTE METRIC (CONTROL) 
 
  Average of 
For as % Yes / No 
Average of 
For as % Shares Out 
Average of 
For as % Votes Cast 
Before Bulletin 14H 
   
Fail 29.95% 22.38% 29.61% 
Pass 72.37% 56.05% 71.30% 
After Bulletin 14H       
Fail 26.07% 20.27% 25.78% 
Pass 73.81% 56.61% 72.13% 
 
TABLE A7. AVERAGE SIZE OF SUPPORT FOR PROPOSALS VOTED 
ON, RELATIVE TO SEC, BY TYPE OF VOTE METRIC (ANALYSIS) 
 
  Average of 
For as % Yes / No 
Average of 
For as % Shares Out 
Average of 
For as % Votes Cast 
Before Bulletin 14H 
   
Fail 20.39% 13.52% 18.00% 
Pass 68.57% 42.40% 57.30% 
After Bulletin 14H       
Fail 19.90% 13.47% 17.70% 
Pass 69.58% 53.94% 63.32% 
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B. Regression Methodology 
All statistical testing was run using the Stata 15 statistics 
package.109 Unless otherwise indicated, regressions were run 
using the logistic command and all coefficients are output as 
transformed odds-ratios. This transformation has no effect on 
the significance of the coefficients or model. 
1. Proposition 1 Model Selection & Fit 
Here, logistic regression is a useful means of testing Prop-
osition 1. Whether a proposal is excluded from a company’s 
proxy materials because the SEC granted no-action relief is a 
binary event: The company can either include or exclude the 
proposal. An independent variable that tracks whether a pro-
posal was made before or after Bulletin 14H can be created. 
The logistic regression will determine whether that event had 
a statistically significant effect on whether a proposal would 
be excluded from a company’s proxy statement.  
In order for the final model to be useful, it must be a sig-
nificantly better predictor of whether a proposal would be ex-
cluded than the no-variable model, meaning that it must be 
more accurate than simply picking whichever category has 
the majority of proposals.  
 
TABLE A2-1. MODEL 1: THE NO-VARIABLE MODEL 
 
Logistic Regression 
Log likelihood = –2161.542 








ProposalExcluded Odds Ratio 
Std. 
Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
_cons .460017 .01681 -21.25 .000 .428217 .494179 
 
Proposition 1 suggests an effect on proposal exclusion 
caused by the release of Bulletin 14H. The most relevant pa-
rameter then is whether the proposal occurred before or after 
 
109 See Features, STATA, https://www.stata.com/features/ 
[perma.cc/B5BC-EWG3]. 
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the Bulletin came out. Model 2 creates a single-variable model 
based on that parameter. 
 
TABLE A2-2. MODEL 2: THE SINGLE-VARIABLE MODEL 
 
Logistic Regression 
Log likelihood = –2159.8696 













Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
MeetingBeforeor-
OnSECMemoDa 1.18673 .11193 1.82 .069 .986443 1.42769 
_cons .400415 .03411 -10.74 .000 .338846 .473171 
 
Model 2 shows the estimated effect of a single independent 
variable, MeetingBeforeorOnSECMemoDa, on whether a pro-
posal was excluded, ProposalExcluded.110 As can be guessed 
from the name, the independent variable indicates whether a 
proposal occurred on or before the date of Bulletin 14H.111 The 
model predicts that proposals occurring on or before Bulletin 
14H are 1.187x more likely to be excluded than those occur-
ring after.  
The Single-Variable Model is probably insufficient to test 
the proposition. The p-value of .069 indicates the variable is 
only significant at the 90% confidence level, and the standard 
level variables must usually reach is 95%.112 The LR chi2(1) 
and Prob >chi2 values also support this conclusion. Prob > 
chi2 indicates whether the model is significantly different 
from the no-variable model based on a comparison of the log 
 
110 Excluded proposals are coded as “1” and all other proposals are 
coded as “0”. Because of the near-perfect overlap between whether no-action 
was granted and whether a proposal was excluded from the proxy statement 
(only 1 in 3469 differed between them), ProposalExcluded is used to test no-
action relief. 
111 Proposals dated on or before Oct. 22, 2015, are coded as “1” and pro-
posals dated after are coded as “0”. 
112 Unless otherwise indicated, all variables are tested as two-tailed, 
requiring a p-value equal to or lesser than the critical value of .05 to be 
significant at the 95% confidence level. 
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likelihoods of the base and current model.113 It too is greater 
than the critical value 0.05, meaning the model is not signifi-
cantly different from the no-variable model at the 95% confi-
dence level. 
The one-variable model is simply too limited. While the re-
lationship between whether no-action relief is granted and 
Bulletin 14H is the entire proposition, the former is a function 
of numerous other forces. For instance, the type of proposal is 
extremely relevant. Bulletin 14H related to social policy pro-
posals, so any change in the other proposal categories may not 
be explained by MeetingBeforeorOnSECMemoDa. In the sin-
gle-variable model, any significance of Bulletin 14H must be 
protected from the effects of outside forces which may be in-
fluencing other proposal types. More variables are required to 
control for those outside effects and isolate, as best as possible, 














113 The likelihood-ratio test determines whether the coefficients are 
jointly significant. The likelihood chi-square statistic can be manually cal-
culated as –2 times the difference between the base and current log likeli-
hood of the models. The null hypothesis is that all coefficients are equal to 
zero—i.e., that they jointly have no effect on the dependent variable. The 
Prob > chi2 gives the probability that the null hypothesis is true. If that 
value is less than or equal to the critical value of .05, then the null hypoth-
esis that the variables are jointly insignificant can be rejected. In other 
words, if (Prob > chi2) is less than .05, at least one of the variables in the 
model significantly improves the model’s ability to predict the effect on the 
dependent variable. 
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TABLE A2-3. MODEL 3: THE MULTIVARIATE MODEL 
 
Logistic Regression 
Log likelihood = –2008.8969 













Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
MeetingBeforeor-
OnSECMemoDa 1.26871 .12693 2.38 .017 1.04280 1.54356 
SubcatEnvrion-
mentalIssues .111979 .03740 -6.56 .000 .058192 .215478 
SubcatSocialIs-
suesRelated .097585 .03154 -7.20 .000 .051798 .183847 
Subcat-




.090171 .02965 -7.32 .000 .047332 .171785 
SubcatMiscellane-
ousCorporate .590624 .21532 -1.44 .149 .289069 1.20676 
SubcatReincorpo-




.072279 .02336 -8.13 .000 .038364 .136179 
SubcatValueMaxi-
mization .158705 .06670 -4.38 .000 .069637 .361689 
DelawareIn-
croporated 1.02826 .08168 0.35 .726 .880007 1.20148 
MarketCapitaliza-
tionmil 1.00000 .00000 5.21 000 1.00000 1.00000 
PillinForce .487462 .19490 -1.80 .072 .222646 1.06725 
_cons 3.39923 1.1265 3.69 .000 1.77536 6.50841 
 
Model 3 includes a series of dummy variables to control for 
the type of proposal,114 as well as whether the company is in-
corporated in Delaware, its market capitalization (in millions 
of U.S. dollars), and whether the company had a poison pill in 
force at the time of the meeting.115  
 
114 The subcategory for “Miscellaneous” proposals is omitted as the 
base case of the dummies created for the subcategories of proposals. 
115 The subcategories for proposals related to Capital Stock and Proxy-
fight Specific proposals are excluded because they perfectly predicted 
whether no-action would be granted. Because this only included 11 pro-
posals of the 3480 in the sample, the effect should not meaningfully alter 
the results. 
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The multivariate model solved the problems of the one-var-
iable model. It significantly improves its estimation over the 
no-variable model with a p-value below well below .05. It fur-
ther identifies a number of significant variables, including 
MeetingBeforeorOnSECDa. It is not perfect, and necessarily 
is limited by the data available. But the type of proposal in 
theory should go a long way in capturing outside effects on no-
action grant rates and isolating the relevant ones.  
Before analyzing the model in depth, it can be reduced by 
the same likelihood-ratio test to correct for the risk that too 
many variables are included. By dropping variables one by 
one and comparing the likelihood ratios of the resulting 
“nested” model to the “full” model, variables made significant 
only due to their interaction with others can be eliminated. 
Table A2-4 shows the Chi2(df) and p-value produced from 
the likelihood-ratio chi2 test on the nested (i.e., one-variable-
less model) and the full model. It indicates that PillInForce, 
DelawareIncorporated, and SubcatMiscellaeousCorporate can 
be dropped without significantly affecting the model’s estima-
tion. 
 
TABLE A2–4. LIKELIHOOD-RATIO COMPARISONS (LRTEST) 
FOR MODELS WITHOUT THE OMITTED VARIABLE, NESTED OF 
MODEL 3. 
 
Variable Omitted Chi2(1) Value Prob > chi2 
PillInForce 3.58 .0583 
MarketCapitalizationmil 26.79 .0000 
DelawareIncorporated .12 .7256 
SubcatValueMaximization 21.18 .0000 
SubcatShareholderRightsTakeo 90.63 .0000 
SubcatRecinorprateInAnother 10.46 .0012 
SubcatMiscellaneousCorporate 2.19 .1389 
SubcatExecutiveCompensationR 71.57 .0000 
SubcatBoardRelated 112.20 .0000 
SubcatSocialIssuesRelated 70.17 .0000 
SubcatEnvironmentalIssuesRelated 55.88 .0000 
MeetingBeforeorOnSECMemoDa 5.77 .0163 
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Model 4 reruns the logistic regression including only the 
lrtest significant variables (p < .05). Re-running the lrtest on 
Model 4, nested of Model 3, confirms that the difference be-
tween the models is insignificant when those variables are in-
cluded. 
 
TABLE A2-5. MODEL 4: PROPOSITION 1 MODEL & RESULTS. 
(STATA LOGISTIC OUTPUT) 
 
Logistic Regression 
Log likelihood = –2011.5598 













Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
MeetingBeforeor-
OnSECMemoDa 1.271 .1271 2.40 .017 1.04457 1.54599 
SubcatEnviron-
mentalIssues .1672 .0322 -9.29 .000 .114640 .243860 
SubcatSocialIs-
suesRelated .1459 .0253 -11.10 .000 .103889 .204993 
Subcat-




.1343 .0248 -10.87 .000 .093485 .192856 
SubcatReincorpo-




.1070 .0188 -12.74 .000 .075848 .150880 
SubcatValueMaxi-
mization .2355 .0752 -4.53 .000 .125869 .440474 
MarketCapitliza-
tionmil 1.000 .0000 5.20 .000 1.00000 1.00000 
_cons 2.305 .4114 4.68 .000 1.62490 3.27049 
 
TABLE A2-6. LIKELIHOOD-RATIO TEST (LRTEST) COMPARING 
MODEL 4 & MODEL 3. 
 
Likelihood-ratio test LR chi2(3) = 5.33 
(Assumption: . nested in full) Prob > chi2 = 0.1494 
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One method for measuring goodness-of-fit, or how well the 
variables explain the data, is the Hosmer-Lemeshow test.116 
Running the test on Model 4 produced the following table.117 
It suggests that the model does not fit the data well (p <.05). 
No firm conclusion can be drawn from the result of the H-L 
test; nevertheless, it is reported here for completeness. 
  
TABLE A2-7. LOGISTIC MODEL FOR PROPOSALEXCLUDED, 
GOODNESS-OF-FIT TEST 
Number of observations =  
Number of groups =  
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(8) = 






How well the model captures the influences on the depend-
ent variable can be measured by its success or failure in clas-
sifying the observations and comparing its predictions to 
these observations.118 The following table provides that com-
parison and shows that there still exists a significant portion 
of unaccounted-for behavior. Model 4 only correctly classified 











116 See Kellie J. Archer & Stanley Lemeshow, Goodness-of-fit Test for a 
Logistic Regression Model Fitted Using Survey Sample Data, 6 STATA J. 97, 
97–98 (2006), http://www.stata-journal.com/sjpdf.html?articlenum=st0099 
[perma.cc/AK4B-49EN]. 
117 The Hosmer-Lemeshow test was run using Stata 15’s estat gof, 
group(10) function. 
118 Classification was done through Stata 15’s estat classification func-
tion. 
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TABLE A2-8. CLASSIFICATION FOR LOGISTIC MODEL FOR 
PROPOSALEXCLUDED 
Classified D (True) ~D (True) Total 
+ 188 71 259 
- 905 2305 3210 
Total 1093 2376 3469 
Classified + if predicted PR(D) >= 0.5 
True D defined as ProposalExcluded != 0 
Sensitivity Pr( + | D) 17.20% 
Specificity Pr( – |~D) 97.01% 
Positive Predictive Value Pr( D | +) 72.59% 
Negative Predictive Value Pr(~D | –) 71.81% 
False + rate for true ~D Pr( + | ~D) 2.99% 
False – rate for true D Pr( – | D) 82.80% 
False + rate for classified + Pr(~D| +) 27.41% 
False – rate for classified - Pr ( D| –) 28.19% 
Correctly classified  71.87% 
 
2. Proposition 2 Model Selection & Fit 
The same procedures were followed to develop the Propo-
sition 2 Model as were used to develop the Proposition 1 
model, which yielded the model shown in Section III.B.2 
 The Hosmer-Lemeshow test suggests that the model 
does not fit the data well (p <.05), reflecting the theoretical 
and practical difficulties surrounding the data. No firm con-
clusion can be drawn from the result of the H-L test; never-
theless, it is reported here for completeness.  
 
TABLE A2-9. LOGISTIC MODEL FOR NOACTIONSOUGHT, 
GOODNESS-OF-FIT TEST 
Number of observations =  
Number of groups =  
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(8) = 






Finally, to further highlight the difficulties inherent in 
modelling Proposition 2, the following table shows its rela-
tively poor ability to correctly classify the observations.  
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TABLE A2-10. CLASSIFICATION FOR LOGISTIC MODEL FOR 
NOACTIONSOUGHT 
Classified D (True) ~D (True) Total 
+ 408 188 596 
- 1013 1858 2871 
Total 1421 2046 3467 
Classified + if predicted PR(D) >= 0.5 
True D defined as ProposalExcluded != 0 
Sensitivity Pr( + | D) 28.71% 
Specificity Pr( – |~D) 90.81% 
Positive Predictive Value Pr( D | +) 68.46% 
Negative Predictive Value Pr(~D | –) 64.72% 
False + rate for true ~D Pr( + | ~D) 9.19% 
False – rate for true D Pr( – | D) 71.29% 
False + rate for classified + Pr(~D| +) 31.54% 
False – rate for classified - Pr ( D| –) 35.28% 
Correctly classified  65.36% 
 
